2025
Conference presentation
Lotteries vs. Auctions: Prover Market Design
EthCC · Cannes, France
How a protocol should choose and compensate provers when liveness is costly and collateral is limited.
Talks
Conference presentations and research talks on the economic design of computational systems.
2024
Conference presentation
Beyond Multidimensional Fee Markets
Devcon SEA · Bangkok, Thailand
Why multidimensional fee markets lose guarantees as transaction and node heterogeneity increases, and how the Broker Mechanism handles the fully heterogeneous setting.
2023
Conference presentation
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
ETHconomics 2 · Devconnect Istanbul · Istanbul, Turkey
How block producers’ private MEV utility creates impossibility results for transaction-fee mechanisms, and how searcher competition enables a tight 1/2 welfare guarantee.
2021
Conference presentation
Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem
Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
Lower bounds for broad families of natural algorithms for the matroid secretary problem.
2020
Conference presentation
Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP)
How asynchronous majority dynamics aggregate noisy private beliefs on preferential-attachment trees, reaching a correct majority quickly with high probability.