I study how to design markets and protocols that remain effective in decentralized and permissionless settings, where participants and infrastructure operators may behave strategically or adversarially.
Google ScholarShowing 12 research projects.
2026
Manuscript
Maryam Bahrani · Michael Neuder · S. Matthew Weinberg
Studies how protocols should procure work that is expensive to produce but cheap to verify in permissionless environments with adversarial suppliers and costly liveness failures.
2026
Preprint
Mahimna Kelkar · Ertem Nusret Tas · Maryam Bahrani · Tim Roughgarden
Characterizes when rewards and leader stake can incentivize responsive block proposals, then shows that multi-leader competition can achieve responsiveness with simpler rewards and no stake requirement.
2025
Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)
Maryam Bahrani · Michael Neuder · S. Matthew Weinberg
Develops a framework for evaluating cutoff selfish-mining strategies under general stochastic rewards, then applies it to a Bitcoin reward model combining the block subsidy, time-accruing fees, and occasional reward spikes.
2024
Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)
Maryam Bahrani · Pranav Garimidi · Tim Roughgarden
Models active block producers with MEV utility, proves impossibility results for transaction-fee mechanisms in general, and gives a searcher-assisted mechanism with a tight 1/2 welfare guarantee.
2024
ACM Economics and Computation (EC)
Maryam Bahrani · S. Matthew Weinberg
Constructs a profitable selfish-mining strategy whose orphan-block pattern is statistically identical to honest mining under greater network delay.
2024
Manuscript
Maryam Bahrani · Naveen Durvasula
Introduces a transaction-fee mechanism for heterogeneous two-sided compute markets in which broker competition leads to efficient individualized prices for users and execution nodes.
2024
Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC)
Maryam Bahrani · Pranav Garimidi · Tim Roughgarden
Develops three models that quantify equilibrium stake concentration from heterogeneous rewards, the rate of concentration when rewards are reinvested, and how builder competition reduces reward differences among proposers under proposer-builder separation.
2023
Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)
Maryam Bahrani · Pranav Garimidi · Tim Roughgarden
Studies truthful two-level auctions in which each bidder is a DAO with an internal bid-aggregation and cost-sharing rule, proving that a logarithmic welfare approximation is both achievable and tight.
2021
Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
Maryam Bahrani · Hedyeh Beyhaghi · Sahil Singla · S. Matthew Weinberg
Establishes impossibility results for two broad algorithmic frameworks for the matroid secretary problem: natural greedy algorithms and randomized partition algorithms.
2020
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP)
Maryam Bahrani · Nicole Immorlica · Divyarthi Mohan · S. Matthew Weinberg
Studies asynchronous local-majority learning on preferential-attachment trees and proves that the process stabilizes in a correct majority within O(n log n / log log n) updates with high probability.
2018
The Electronic Journal of Combinatorics
Maryam Bahrani · Jérémie Lumbroso
Turns forbidden-induced-subgraph descriptions into constrained split-decomposition grammars, yielding enumerations for ptolemaic, block, and several cactus graph classes.
2018
Analytic Algorithmics and Combinatorics (ANALCO)
Maryam Bahrani · Jérémie Lumbroso
Characterizes split-decomposition trees of cactus graphs, derives symbolic grammars, and implements random generation in a setting whose prime nodes are cycles.